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Various forms of revenue insurance have been applied in Canada and in the US with relative 
success. In this paper different combinations of traditional agricultural policies and revenue and 
yield insurance are analysed for the Spanish olive oil sector. Taking a database containing about 
half million Spanish olive growers during 8 campaigns, five possible policies are studied and the 
results are examined according to different criteria including average revenue and its variability, 
growers utility gains, taxpayers cost and the transfer efficiency of support. The policies analysed 
are: (1) non-intervention; (2) the policy currently in force in Spain that combines a production aid 
with a yield insurance; (3) a revenue insurance, only; (4)  revenue insurance combined with a 
production aid; and  (5) an aid per tree in combination with revenue insurance. The methodology is 
based on Monte-Carlo simulations performed on about 100 groups of growers that have been 
grouped according to their expected yields and variability. Assuming and estimating olive oil price 
and yields correlations for each group of growers, the analysis allows for consistent policy 
comparisons at a very disaggregate level. Using the results for all analysed groups, policies are 
ranked based on the above criteria at the provincial and national levels. Results show that the 
current regime of EU production aids of olive oil eliminates the advantage of extending the current 
yield insurance to a revenue insurance.  It is also shown that the level of support delivered by 
production aids cannot be reached with revenue insurance even with completely subsidised 
premiums. Finally, it is shown that the policy that combines tree aids with revenue insurance 
exhibits good results for all examining criteria. 
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Introduction 
The denomination ‘revenue insurance’ comprises a variety of mechanisms for stabilising the 
revenue of farmers based on the theory of agricultural insurance. All these mechanisms have the 
common objective to reduce farmers’ revenue variability. As they are based on the joint treatment 
of climate risks and market risks, they permit insuring farmers against decrease in revenue caused 
by a drop in prices, lower levels of yield or a combination of both causes. 
The idea of insuring farmers’ revenue by extending the traditional methods of price 
stabilisation or yield insurance, which were used separately until very recently, stems from various 
factors.  On the one hand, the liberalisation of the agricultural markets could be associated to 
greater price instability (Meuwissen et al., 1999); on the other, the greater degree of market 
competition could lead farmers to look for economic efficiency based on production specialisation, 
thus making their economic results more sensitive to the variability in yield and to the prices of a 
reduced number of products.  The fact that, in agreement with the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), public subsidies in the field of agricultural insurance policies would be qualified under 
certain conditions as ‘green box’  (European Commission, 2001) has had considerable importance. 
Lastly and, perhaps the main reason, is the idea that revenue insurance policy may be a more 
efficient alternative to the traditional policies of revenue stabilisation, shifting the taxpayers burden 
from the latter to subsidise farmers’ insurance premiums.  
At the beginning of the 90’s, the US and Canada began to develop different mechanisms of  
revenue insurance policies, by applying formulas based on the stabilisation of the revenue of a 
single product, of the whole farm revenues  or by developing mechanisms more along the lines of 
mutual societies (Goodwin and Ker, 1998 b; Skees, 2000).  Nowadays, 31.7% of the insured 
acreage in the USA is covered by some form of revenue insurance (RMA, 2001). The European 
Commission has commissioned several studies focusing on the broader topic of agricultural risks, 
among which revenue insurance policies have received special attention, and has motivated 
empirical work to examine various formulas of revenue insurance (Meuwissen et al., 1999). In 
Alava (Spain) the Potato Compensation Fund was initiated in 1997 under the form of individual 
accounts. Although it has not received much attention, perhaps due to the fact that only 150 
growers are members (year 2001), it is worth analysing in detail since it is applied to a sector 
without a Common Market Organisation (CMO) and that takes in clearly differentiated productions 
depending on the crop varieties and collection dates (Sumpsi et al., 2001).  This experience follows 
a formula similar to the Canadian NISA (Net Income Stabilisation Accounts), but in the case of 
Alava the state contribution to each member’s account is based on the surface planted each year 
and not on the farmer’s sales. 
The overall results of the international experiences show that revenue insurance policies are 
difficult to design and administer (Meuwissen et al., 2000). On top of the traditional problems of 
crop insurance, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, there is the difficulty of carrying out a 
statistical analysis of the prices (Goodwin et al., 2000) and evaluating the correlation between 
prices  and farmers’ yields, or at least area average yields (Turvey and Amanor-Boadu, 1989; 
Skees, 2000).  From an actuarial point of view, sound revenue insurance premiums are clearly 
dependent on the reliability with which the correlation between prices and yields can be estimated.  
Further difficulties are encountered when trying to analyse the pros and cons of revenue 
insurance that  totally or partially replaces a traditional instrument to stabilise or support farmers’ 
revenue. While in general insurance policies should be used only for stabilisation purposes, loss 
ratios in the neighbourhood of 1.5 (as in the US) are an indication that premiums are consistently 
lower than the paid indemnities, and that insurance delivers also revenue support in addition to   3
revenue stabilisation. In their analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and possible 
ways for reform, Buckwell et al., 1997 sustain that, although a clear distinction should be made 
between policies for sustaining farmers’ revenues and policies for revenue stabilisation, the 
dividing line is not always that clear.  This debate of both a conceptual and empirical nature, is 
present in the relevant literature, perhaps due to the strong implications for future negotiations on 
agricultural trade in the World Trade Organisation (see Wu and Adams, 2001 and Young et al., 
2001). 
Several authors have comparisons of different revenue stabilisation policies using a variety of 
formulas of revenue insurance. Calkins et al., (1997) show that revenue insurance allows the 
agricultural farmers of Quebec to obtain greater expected income than a price insurance added to a 
yield insurance or than a system of individual savings accounts that receive state contributions.  
Their results also show that revenue insurance ensures greater efficiency of public expenditure, 
measured in terms of increase in gross margin per dollar of taxpayers contribution. Coble et al., 
(2000) show that revenue insurance policies are potential substitutes for other risk reduction 
strategies, such as hedging in futures and options. This indicates that revenue insurance has some 
properties that can be assimilated to the use of derivative markets, although it could constitute a 
more efficient tool for risk reduction by also protecting against drops in yields. Miller et al. (2000) 
find no clear advantages of revenue insurance over yield insurance in the case of peach growers 
because of the low correlation between yields and prices. Stokes et al. (1997) show that insuring 
for the whole farm’s revenues is more efficient than insuring each crop by a different revenue 
insurance policy. 
In spite of the increasing interest from both the methodological and analytical viewpoint 
ignited by the advent of revenue insurance policies, few works have tackled the alternative of 
replacing or complementing traditional tools of income support for farmers with revenue insurance 
policies. Hennessy et al., (1997), in a study that is considered a key antecedent of this current work, 
show that  revenue insurance would guarantee producers 75% of their expected revenue by way of 
deficiency payments offered to maize and soya producers in the USA, at a fifth of the taxpayers 
cost. Such a degree of superiority of revenue insurance over the programme of deficiency 
payments gives rise to many methodological and empirical queries concerning the possible 
generalisation of this result to other sectors or circumstances. For example, the fact that all the 
Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out on the same representative farm or that the target price for 
the deficiency payments is considered fixed and not variable with the simulated production, could 
be assumptions that may be  too restrictive for other contexts.   
Objectives 
The objective of this work is precisely to carry out a comparative analysis of a series of tools 
for stabilising olive oil growers revenues based on revenue insurance products, with other classical 
tools for sustaining and stabilising revenues. The policies analysed are: (1) non-intervention; (2) 
the policy currently in force in Spain that combines a production aid with a yield insurance; (3) a 
revenue insurance, only; (4)  revenue insurance combined with a production aid; and  (5) an aid per 
tree in combination with revenue insurance.  The comparison will be carried out for the Spanish 
olive oil sector, although the conclusions derived from the analysis might be generalised to the 
other two European Union (EU) main producers, Italy and Greece, given that the same support 
policy is applied to the olive oil sector in the EU.   
The olive oil sector is of special interest due to its economic and territorial importance and to 
the intense level of support granted by the EU Olive oil Common Market Organisation.  From a 
methodological point of view, this work is a contribution to the literature on the subject since it   4
goes into a detailed analysis of the correlation between prices and yields, estimated for groups of 
homogeneous growers. It also incorporates the correlation of production aid, whose magnitude 
varies with each EU member state total production, and farmers’ yields. This allows for detailed 
policy comparisons at a very disaggregate level, and it also relaxes restrictive assumptions 
commonly found in the literature, that could affect the reliability of the premiums calculated on the 
basis of such suppositions (Hennessy et al., 1997; Meuwissen, 2000; Calkins et al., 1997; Miller et 
al., 2000). 
  This study is motivated by the interest of ENESA (Spanish National Agency of Agricultural 
Insurance), the public body that implements the agricultural insurance policies in Spain, to study 
the possibility of converting some of its lines of yield insurance into revenue insurance. The 
database available for the study, which  ENESA administers and updates systematically,   
containing in the case of the olive oil sector more than 500,000 growers with individual yields for 8 
campaigns, provides a context setting very unusual for similar kinds of policy analysis.  
 
The Spanish olive oil sector 
Olive groves in Spain cover an area of more than 2.3 million hectares, of which only 5.3% is 
dedicated to the growing of table olives.  Figure 1 shows that olive growing has experienced a 
slight upward trend in the last fifteen years.  This study is going to concentrate on seven Spanish 
provinces (Jaén, Córdoba, Málaga, Badajoz, Toledo, Lérida and Tarragona), which together 
represent 62% of the surface and 73.7% of the total production. Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
olive production in Spain between 1980 and 2000.   
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the surface dedicated to olive-growing in Spain (1000 hectares) 
Source: Data from MAPA
2 Yearbooks  
 
                                                           
























Figure 2. Spanish Oil Production 
Source: Data from MAPA Yearbooks 
 
Yields are very sensitive to climatic conditions, specially to meteorological droughts. This is 
one of the reasons why, since the 2000-2001 crop year, there now exists in Spain a yield insurance 
that guarantees overall production in the face of any adverse climatic conditions.  
The EU is the world leader in the production of olive oil and in foreign trade, contributing 70% 
of the world figures in both fields. The remaining 30% of the production is divided between 
Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey. The largest importers are the USA (46% of world imports) and the 
EU (44%), followed by Japan, Brazil, Australia and Canada who are also importers but of much 
less importance.   
During the course of a marketing campaign the variability of prices is small due to the fact that 
the stock that links one campaign to the next attenuates in part the variations in production. Yet 
there is evidence that the level of the connecting stock between one campaign and the next is 
insufficient to absorb the impact caused in the market by important rises and falls in harvest levels. 
Figure 3 shows the sequence of weekly prices, referring to the index prices collected by the 
Spanish Ministry of  Agriculture, from the first week of calendar year 1989 to the last week of 
1999. The continuity between campaigns can be clearly appreciated, although the abrupt rise at the 











































Figure 3: Weekly oil prices 
Source: Data from MAPA 
 
Since 1970, the olive oil sector of the EU has been subjected to different intervention policies.  
Until the 1998 reform the olive oil CMO was based on a production aid, a consumption aid and a 
purchase intervention mechanism, which guaranteed producers a minimum price (intervention 
price). From the 1998 campaign onwards, a new Common Market Organisation was stablished. It 
was initially intended for the following three campaigns but is still in force today, and it  consists 
in a maximum production aid of 1.29 €/kg of olive oil but with no intervention mechanisms. The 
aid of 1.29 €/kg suffers reductions proportional to the surplus of overall Spanish production over 
760.027 Tn of olive oil, a fact that has key implications for policy analysis purposes. 
Nowadays the olive oil CMO also counts on a support system for private storage, which is 
applied when the price of olive oil falls below the reference price fixed by the European 
Commission at 95% of the intervention price applicable to the 1997-98 campaign, equivalent to 
1.66 €/kg of olive oil. But to date, the use of subsidised private storage has been very limited.  
 
Methodology 
With the aim to analyse the efficiency of several alternative policies for protecting farmers’ 
revenue, a series of Monte-Carlo simulations have been carried out. This has made it possible to 
generate 5,000 hypothetical situations of prices and yields for 100 groups of farms, (with an 
average of 196 farms per group), formed according to criteria which are later described on the basis 
of the real data observed. The effects of different policies on farmers’ revenues and levels of utility 
have been simulated in the hypothetical situations. Five policy scenarios have been chosen for the 
simulation: four combine stabilisation and support revenue tools (insurance and direct payments) 
and the fifth is a reference policy, with which the rest are compared, that consists in a policy of 
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i;   Revenue per tree in the farm i and campaign t, expressed in €/tree 
P
t;   Random price of olive oil in campaign t, expressed in €/kg of oil. 
Y
t
i;   Random yield per tree in the farm i expressed in kg of oil/tree. 
(1.29-f(Y
t)); Production aid expressed in €/kg, as a result of having subtracted from 1.29 €/kg the 
corresponding penalty that depends on the random national production Y
t,  when it surpasses 
760,027 Tn. 
s;   proportion of insurance premiums paid by growers (it is fixed at 0.5 in policies 2, 4 and 5; 0  
for policy 3). 
Pr(E(Y
t
i),σYi ) ; Individual yield premium, evaluated according to the average yields and the 




i),σYi×Pt ); Individual revenue insurance premium, evaluated taking into account the 
average income of the individual producer and its typical deviation, calculated in €/tree. 
TA;   Aid per tree, expressed in €/tree. 
 
Assumptions: 
•  Production aid:  As stated above, the subsidy per kilo of olive oil was fixed by the 
European Commission at 1.29 €/kg of olive oil. However, when overall production of each 
member state surpasses its guaranteed maximum quantity, this aid per kilo is reduced in 
proportion to the excess of production. This guarantees that the aggregate level of support 
delivered to the olive sector of each member state is constant. If yields are subject to systemic 
risks, caused generally by drought periods, the production aid is truly a random variable that 
depends on total production. Thus, for policy comparisons it is important to take into account in 
the Monte-Carlo simulations the correlation between national production and individual yields, 
because the latter will be indirectly correlated with the production aid. In order to calculate the 
aid to the producer for each of the 5000 simulations we do the following: we take the 5000 
draws from the probability distribution of yields specific to each group of producers, and using 
the empirical correlation between the group yields and national average yields we obtain the   8
most likely value of national production following the procedure developed by Johnson and 
Tenenbein (1981). When this national production has surpassed the maximum guaranteed 
quantity of 760,027 Tm of olive oil, the final aid of 1.29 €/kg is reduced proportionally.  In this 
way, when the yields of a group of producers is strongly correlated with the overall production 
of the country, the unitary aid in €/kg will be negatively correlated with the yield of the group. 
•  Yield insurance and revenue insurance: Both yield insurance and revenue insurance have 
a coverage level of 100%, with a 30% absolute franchise. The premiums to be paid include 
administrative costs of the insurance system. These costs represent the 40% of the premium. 
The farmer receives a subsidy of 50% of the premium in policies 2, 4 and 5, and a subsidy of 
100% in the policy that only uses revenue insurance (policy 3).  For the case of revenue 
insurance, the revenue which is compared with the insured level is simply the result of the yield 
multiplied by market price, for each of the 5,000 pairs of yield-price observations generated.  
The insured revenue is the average of the result of the 5,000 prices multiplied by the 5,000 
yields. The final revenue is the result of multiplying price by yield minus the part of the 
premium paid by the farmer, plus the indemnity payment when it exists. 
•  Aid per tree:  In policy 5,  production aids are substituted by a fixed aid per tree. These 
are considered fixed grants for each tree on the farm, being only differentiated at two levels: 
one, a larger grant (4.4 €/tree) for farms with an average yield that surpasses the average 
national yield, and the other, a smaller grant (3 €/tree), for all those farms with an average yield 
below the national average.  In this way differences between the various provinces are avoided.  
The figure of 6.9474 Kgs of olive oil per tree has been taken as the average national yield. 
 
Analysis and origin of the data 
•  Yields:  The data, made available by the Spanish National Agricultural Insurance Agency 
(ENESA), is obtained from the declarations presented by olive growers from all over the 
country in order to obtain the CAP production aids from 1991-1998. The basic data for each 
grower consist in the number of olive trees and the declared yield in each campaign. The work 
has been done with groups of farms in order to carry out the simulations of the different 
scenarios of policies and insurance, taking the group of farms as an analysis unit.  Growers 
were grouped taking into account: (1) the province to which they belong; (2) their average 
yields, following the 19 typologies used in the existing yield insurance (<3; 3-5; 5-7; ..., 51-57 
and >57 kg olive oil/tree); (3) their level of risk, taking as the risk indicator the coefficient of 
variation (CV<0.4; 0.4 ≤ CV < 0.8; 0.8 ≤ CV < 1.2; CV ≥ 1.2). This criteria of grouping 
producers ensures that the results obtained for each group are highly significant for all the 
farms included in the analysis. The work sample is selected from the set of all growers 
operating in 7 provinces (Badajoz, Córdoba, Toledo, Jaén, Málaga, Lérida and Tarragona), 
which pass the following filters: (1) having complete historical records; (2) not being a small 
farmer, as defined by the CMO; (3) having average yields falling in one of the following 7 
categories: <3, 7-9, 13-15, 19-21, 28-32, 40-45, >57 kg olive oil/tree (which means that we 
arbitrarily remove from the complete sample those growers whose average yields fall in the 
remaining  12 typologies). The final work sample results in a selection of 100 groups (19,600 
growers) . 
•  Prices: For the prices we have taken the annual averages of the virgin olive oil index prices 
with a < 1º level of acidity, from the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food . The 
prices have been deflated and the temporal trend has been eliminated with the aim to find the   9
risk level of the prices. Nevertheless, prior to 1998 there was a market intervention tool in the 
EU which was added to the production aid and avoided price reductions below intervention 
level.  Therefore, in order to calculate the expected price of olive oil it has been necessary to 
eliminate this effect. Taking into account that the increase in the average price due to the 
intervention mechanism could be roughly estimated in 0.42 €/kg, the series of prices gave an 
average value in 2002 of 1.98 €/kg. It is further assumed that the standard deviation is constant 
both during the intervention period as well as after 1998.   
 Simulation 
5,000 yields for each group of farms and 5,000 possible prices for the year 2000 have been 
generated from the distribution function of prices and yields, taking into account the correlation  
between both. We assume that the yields follow a beta distribution, whose parameters have been 
calculated according to the average and typical deviation of the groups and whose maximum is the 
group’s maximum yield and the minimum is 0. Thus, we avoid the problems of adverse selection 
found by Meuwissen, (2000) in the simulation of yield and revenue insurance for 3 potato-growing 
farms in Baden-Würtemberg. The adverse selection problems arise when the premium rates are 
calculated using a distribution function that corresponds to the total yields from all the farms, and 
then premiums and indemnities are applied to individual risk-heterogeneous farms. 
It is assumed that olive oil prices follow a lognormal distribution function, the average and 
standard deviation as explained above. This follows the suggestion of Goodwin et al. (2000), who 
analysed the distribution of prices, concluding that assuming normality of prices would give rise to 
important errors in insurance premiums rates. Their analysis points to combinations of normal and 
lognormal distributions, the weight of the latter being predominant.   
In order to measure the correlation between the group yields and national prices the 
Spearman’s  coefficient of correlation has been used. The generation of both variables has been 
carried out according to Johnson and Tenenbein, (1981). This procedure consists in generating 
5,000 random numbers for each of two variables U’ and V’, drawn from two normally distributed 
distribution functions (0,1).  From these variables we generate two new variables, U and V being: 
U=U’ and V= cU’+(1-c)V’ 
Where c is a coefficient that reflects the relation between the yield and price variables. “c” can 
be calculated from Spearman’s Rho coefficient or from Kendall’s Tau coefficient of correlation.  U 
and V are correlated with each other and  their distribution functions are the following: 




Where F() is the accumulated probability function for a normal standard variable.  Finally, we 
obtain the sought variables, the yield Y, which follows a beta distribution function (B) and price 




-1(H2(V)) if the correlation is positive 
P= L
-1(1-H2(V)) if the correlation is negative 
 
Results and discussion 
The simulated data have been obtained from the work sample of 100 groups mentioned above. 
The level of representation of this sample in the total’s ENESA database fluctuates between 9.5% 
and 22.5% depending on the province, and is 11.7% for the whole of Spain.    10
The Spearman’s rho (ρs) coefficient of correlation of prices and yields for the different groups 
fluctuates between -0.023 of a group in Badajoz and -0.548 of a group in Jaén (Kendall’s tau 
(τ) between -0.017 and -0.409). The Spearman’s rho (ρs)  coefficient of correlation between group 
yields and national production fluctuates between 0.143 for a Badajoz group and 0.976 for a group 
from Jaén, the average being 0.64.   
All results are expressed in euros/tree. Table 4 presents the results per province and for the sum 
of the provinces considered for the 5 policy scenarios that have been described above. 
 
Table 4. (Results expressed in €/tree) 
 




7 provinces  12.75  0.52  11.77  0  0  0 
Badajoz 5.74  0.59  5.18  0 0  0 
Córdoba 12.93  0.53  11.88  0 0  0 
Jaén 13.59  0.49  12.63  0  0  0 
Lér+Tar 6.22  0.62  5.53  0 0  0 
Málaga 18.62  0.54  17.13  0  0  0 
Toledo 6.18  0.69  5.29  0  0  0 
 
* The two criteria for efficiency ∆CE/PE and ∆E(R)/ PE – increase in certainty equivalent over public expenditure and 
increase in expected income over public expenditure, respectively – are referred to policy 1, which has intervention.  









7 provinces  20.86  0.40  20.02  8.92  0.93  0.91  7 provinces 13.76 0.40  13.27  1.69  0.89  0.60 
Badajoz  9.33 0.47 8.84  3.98  0.92 0.90  Badajoz 6.31  0.45  6.04  0.95  0.91  0.60 
Córdoba  21.13  0.42 20.20 9.00  0.92 0.91  Córdoba 14.01 0.42  13.48  1.80 0.89 0.60 
Jaén  22.23  0.38 21.43 9.46  0.93 0.91  Jaén 14.59 0.39  14.10  1.66  0.88  0.60 
Lér+Tar  10.23  0.50 9.63  4.54  0.90 0.88  Lér+Tar 6.92  0.46  6.61  1.18  0.92  0.60 
Málaga  30.63  0.44 29.25 13.23 0.92 0.91  Málaga 20.17 0.42  19.41  2.58  0.89  0.60 
Toledo  10.30  0.55 9.57  4.85  0.88 0.85  Toledo 7.05  0.48  6.70  1.46  0.97  0.60 
 
Policy 4  E(R)  CV  CE  PE  ∆CE/ 
PE 
∆E(R)/ 




7 provinces  20.83  0.41  19.94  8.76  0.93 0.92 7 provinces 17.20 0.31 16.82  5.25  0.96  0.85
Badajoz  9.33 0.47  8.84  3.97 0.92 0.90 Badajoz 9.58 0.29 9.39  4.25  0.99  0.90
Córdoba  21.11 0.43 20.15  8.90 0.93 0.92 Córdoba 17.32 0.33 16.90  5.21 0.96 0.84
Jaén  22.19 0.39 21.33  9.26 0.94 0.93 Jaén 18.16 0.30 17.79  5.37  0.96  0.85
Lér+Tar  10.22 0.51  9.59  4.47 0.91 0.89 Lér+Tar 10.17 0.31 9.96  4.49 0.99 0.88
Málaga  30.59 0.44 29.14 13.00 0.92 0.92 Málaga 23.26 0.35 22.64  5.86  0.94  0.79
Toledo  10.27 0.57  9.47  4.67 0.90 0.88 Toledo 10.48 0.31 10.26  5.02  0.99  0.86  11
Table 4 provides results for two measures of efficiency transfer of support: 
•  The increase of certainty equivalent over public expenditure  ∆CE/PE, referred to policy 1 (non 
intervention) as the reference point, gives an indication of efficiency transfer of support based 
on the utility gains per € of taxpayers cost. 
•  The increase of expected revenue over public expenditure ∆E(R)/PE, also referred to policy 1,  
provides indication of the efficiency transfer of support based on the increase of expected 
revenue per € of taxpayers cost. 
On examining the results of Table 4 the following conclusions can be extracted: 
Expected revenue: The policies with production aids (policies 2, 4 and 5), ensure a much 
greater level of revenue than policy 3 (revenue insurance, only). Even subsidising 100% of the 
premiums  of revenue insurance would not be enough to reach revenue levels similar to the current 
ones, and similar to the ones obtained in all policies that include the production aid currently 
granted by the EU to olive oil growers. This implies that revenue insurance is insufficient to 
deliver an equivalent level of support delivered by the production aid. Policy 5, based on tree aids 
and revenue insurance,  provides slightly lower expected revenue. 
Distributional effects: The policy that makes the most equal distribution of expenditure, in 
terms of €/tree, is policy 5. In this case, the average public expenditure per tree fluctuates between 
4.25 for Badajoz and 5.86 €/tree for Málaga.  The one which makes the least equal distribution of 
expenditure is policy 2, reaching 13.23 for Málaga and 3.98 €/tree for Badajoz.  This shows that 
the substitution of all or part of the production aid with insurance subsidies has redistribution 
effects. Channelling taxpayers’ cost from production aid to subsidies to insurance premiums tend 
to reduce the level of support to farms with a greater average yield, specially farms in irrigated 
areas in which the variation in yields is significantly lower. This leads to a smaller dispersion of 
subsidies and levels of revenue between the different provinces. 
Taxpayers’ cost: The most costly policy in terms of €/tree is policy 2, reaching an average of 
8.92 €/tree.  We estimate that the total cost for Spain would reach 1,233.46 million € per year with 
50% of olive trees covered by insurance policies (Table 5).  The next policy in terms of cost would 
be scenario 4, with an average cost of 8.76 €/kg, whose total cost has been estimated at 1,221.91 
million €s/year.  The least costly policy, with the exception of policy 1 that does not incur in public 
expenditure, is number 3 (revenue insurance with a 100% subsidy), with an average of only 1.69 
€/tree.  However, it has to be taken into account that the final expected revenue is much lower than 
the current revenue (Policy 2). 
 
Table 5.  Estimated taxpayers cost for the work sample (100 groups) and for Spain 
Policy  Cost of premium 
subsidies 
€/olive tree 
Cost of production 
aids or tree aids 
€/olive tree 
Total average cost*
 €/olive tree 
Total cost in Spain* 
(million €/year)  
(146,553,195 olive trees) 
Policy  2
  1 7.92  8.42 1233.46 
Policy  3  1.69 0 0.84  123.10 
Policy  4 0.77 7.92 8.31  1217.86 
Policy 5  1  4.25  4.75  696.13 
*Supposing that 50% of the olive trees are covered by the different insurance policies. 
In order to compare the results of each policy, three rankings have been carried out. The 
indicators used in each ranking are: 1) the minimum  coefficient  of variation, 2) the maximum 
∆E(R)/PE, and 3) the maximum ∆CE/PE. The following scoring criteria has been used: (1) The   12
results of each policy in each groups are compared; (2) we give a score of 1 to the policy that wins 
in each group and 0 to all the rest; (3) the weighted average score for each policy is calculated, 
with the number of olive trees that represents each group in each province as a weighting criteria.  
Table 6 shows the results of the ranking according to the three criteria.  
 
Table 6: Ranking of policies according to three criteria 
  Minimum of CV  ∆E(R)/PE  ∆CE/PE 
Geographical Area  Best policy  Second Best  Best policy  Second Best  Best policy  Second Best 
All 7 provinces  5  3  4  5  5  4 
Badajoz   5 3 5 4 5 3 
Córdoba  5 3 4 5 5 4 
Jaén  5 2 4 5 5 4 
Lérida +Tarragona  5 3 5 4 5 3 
Málaga  5 3 4 5 5 4 
Toledo  5 3 4 5 5 3 
The policies are: (1) No intervention; (2) Yield insurance+production aids; (3) Only revenue insurance; (4) Revenue 
insurance+production aids; (5) Revenue insurance+tree aids. 
 
Policy rankings shown on Table 6 are now discussed. First, Policy 5 ensures the lowest 
variability of revenues followed by policy 3.  According to the first criteria of efficiency of public 
expenditure  ∆E(R)/PE, the first place is occupied by both policy 4 (current aids and revenue 
insurance with a 50% subsidy) and policy 5 (aids per tree with revenue insurance with a 50% 
subsidy). It can be seen that in the provinces with lower expected yields, Badajoz, 
Lérida+Tarragona and Toledo, policy 5 is the preferred one. Whereas in Málaga, Jaén and 
Córdoba, with an expected yield of twice the size of the previous provinces, policy 4 is preferred.  
According to the second proposed criteria for efficiency transfer of support, ∆CE/PE, policy 5 
comes in first, both for all the 7 provinces together and for each province on its own.  This denotes 
that in combination with the revenues insurance, the tree aid reduces risk more effectively than the 
production aid.   
Given that the total taxpayers cost of policy 5 is lower than for policies 3 and 4, it may seem 
likely that if it were increased, the efficiency of expenditure would be reduced due to the concavity 
of the utility function, and thus we would end up with similar results to the ones in the previous 
point, with policies 4 and 5 nearing second place. But as we saw above, policy 5 provides the 
minimum CV, and would thus turn out to be superior to Scenario 4.  We can see in Table 4, that in 
spite of the fact that policy 4 surpasses policy 2 in all rankings, the degree of efficiency of both 
policies is very similar. Thus we deduce that the greater degree of efficiency of revenue insurance 
is partially offset by the fact that production aid drops when yields grow, imperfectly reproducing 
the foundations of any revenue insurance, when price and yields are negatively correlated.  
 
Having observed that the results of policies 2 and 4 do not differ very much, it is interesting to 
make a comparison of revenue insurance and yield insurance in an isolated way.  To do this the 
indemnities payments that would have been made in the 1991-1998 campaigns if both insurance 
policies had existed have been simulated.  From the results obtained, which are summarised in 
Table 7, we deduce that the yield insurance’s impact is much stronger than revenue insurance’s  for 
two reasons. One, because average indemnities payments is almost three times higher for yield 
insurance than for revenue insurance. This confirms that vis-à-vis revenue insurance is much   13
cheaper than yield insurance. Secondly, because revenue insurance is also more balanced, as its 
simulated maximum indemnity is much lower, and the minimum is higher, than yield insurance’s. 
This suggests that the cost of reinsurance of  revenue insurance is, in relative terms, much lower 
than the cost of reinsurance of yield insurance. 
Table 7: Comparison of the indemnity payments for yield insurance and revenue insurance: 
(Indemnities evaluated in millions of €s for the national total assuming that 50% of the olive trees 
in Spain are covered by the different insurance policies.) 
Years 1991-1998  Yield insurance 
(Policy 2) 
Revenue insurance 
(Policies 4 &5) 
Average indemnities  20.8  7.1 
Maximum annual indemnities  151.5  46.1 




Five different policies that support or stabilise olive oil producers revenues have been analysed: 
(1) No intervention (provides the comparison reference); (2) current EU production aid and yield 
insurance; (3) revenue insurance; (4) revenue insurance and EU current production aid; (5) revenue 
insurance and tree-based aid. Results show that Policy 5 has shown the best properties: (1) It places 
most of  the budgetary cost in the tree aid, which is thought to provide a quasi-decoupled form of 
revenue support (on average, 81% of the cost would be assigned to tree aid, and 19% to subsidise 
revenue insurance premiums); (2) it reduces variability of revenue to a minimum; (3) it is the most 
equitable in terms of total expenditure per olive tree; and (4) it has the most efficient transfer of 
support from taxpayers to producers. The main disadvantage of scenario 5 is that the national 
average revenue would diminish in about 3 €/tree with regard to scenarios 2 and 4. This differences 
are sharply marked  looking at  expected revenue losses in the provinces with the highest yields, 
like Málaga which would lose around 7 €/tree and Jaén with a loss of 4 €/tree.  
We leave for future research going further into the study of a policy of aids per tree or perhaps 
per hectare, to which a revenue insurance could be added.  Special care would have to be taken 
with this modality of aid, so that although it may vary with the provincial or county average yields, 
it would need to preserve the characteristic of an aid partially decoupled from production.  
As far as revenue insurance is concerned we have noticed that the current policy that combines 
a production aid with yield insurance gives results that are very similar to the ones that would be 
obtained by maintaining the current production aid and substituting the yield insurance for a 
revenue insurance. The theoretical superiority in efficiency of revenue insurance is offset by the 
way production aid is calculated for each year and EU member state. Thus, the results show 
without any ambiguity that a revenue insurance that were to replace the yield insurance, 
maintaining the regime of production aids, would not offer important improvements for any of the 
proposed analysis criteria, neither at national level nor for each of the provinces analysed. This 
result is motivated by the combination of two circumstances. The first one is that yields of Spanish 
olive are subject to climatic effects that are common to a large extent, which means that the yields 
of farms are positively correlated with each other, and in consequence, with the production of the 
country.  And, in second place, since the quantity of production aid (in €/kg) depends on the total 
production of the country, it happens that the high yields are associated with less aids and vice-
versa. The resulting effect from both factors is to eliminate to a large degree the interest in 
substituting the yield insurance with revenue insurance, as long as the production aid is maintained   14
in its current formula. If the yields of Italy and Greece are equally subjected to climatic processes 
that affect most of their  olive-growing farms, the results obtained in this study can be generalised 
in full for these two EU countries. 
Another outstanding conclusion of this study is that when the level of support provided by a 
policy to a sector is very high, as is clearly the case of the olive oil sector in the EU, then a revenue 
insurance policy reveals itself incapable of replacing it in an efficient way, even supposing that it 
were to subsidise the overall premium of the producers.  However, if a part of the support for the 
sector is totally decoupled from production and the other part is channelled by way of a revenue 
insurance, the resulting policy would be much cheaper and more efficient.  This would be the case 
of the tree aids combined with revenue insurance (policy scenario 5 in this study).   
From a methodological perspective, it is shown that using micro-level data, instead of area, 
county or province data, broadens the analysis and implications in a number of ways.  First it 
allows for making cross-section comparisons not only based on geographical grounds but also on 
the level of market and yield risks that each individual grower faces. Secondly, it ensures that 
actuarially-based individual premiums are calculated more accurately, which in turn, permits 
making policy  comparisons at the most disaggregate level. Lastly, it makes realistic assumptions 
about the expected receipts granted to each grower by policies that embody budget stabilising 
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